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differences we consider are: eligibility, dependence of transfers on the number of children, and
generosity of transfers. Our simulations indicate that the policy differences can account for the
higher rate of single-parenthood in the U.S. They also show that Canadian welfare policy is more
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1. Introduction
A recurring question in the design of social policy is whether rules that target aid to those
who need it most might be less effective in reducing long-run poverty than programs that offer
aid to a wider population.2 Targeting disadvantaged families on the basis of characteristics
that make poverty particularly dire, such as single motherhood, can provide larger average
benefits with lower total cost. However, since these characteristics are endogenous, targeting
aid weakens the incentives to avoid poverty. Thus welfare payments designed to help children
of single parents can, at least in principle, increase the fraction of children who are born to
single parents. A universal system reduces the risk of such outcomes. Which type of system
is more efficient depends critically on the relative responsiveness of potential recipients along
the margins targeted.
Until recently, the main U.S. welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), via its rules governing eligibility and benefits, penalized women for marriage and
rewarded them for non-marital fertility. Could it be that such policies actually increased
poverty and single-motherhood? Although the general conclusion in recent reviews by Mof-
fitt (1997) and Moffitt (2003) is that welfare is likely to affect family structure, the debate is
still going on if the response of family decisions, like marriage and fertility, to the incentives
implied by welfare programs is large enough to have significant effects on family structure.3
Central issues in the empirical estimation of these effects are the possibility of reverse causal-
ity, i.e. that welfare policies are responses to poverty as well as vice versa, how to account for
the interactions between welfare and labor supply, marriage and fertility decisions, and how
to capture forward-looking behavior. These issues are discussed in detail by Moffitt (1997)
and Keane and Wolpin (2002).
Canadian welfare programs are much less biased against marriage and less responsive to
higher fertility.4 They are also more generous on average than U.S. programs. While AFDC
2See Akerlof (1978) for an earlier analysis of targeted and universal programs and Atkinson (1995) for a
recent review.
3This literature on incentive effects of the U.S. welfare system can be traced back at least as far as
discussion of the negative income tax by Friedman (1962).
4There are surprisingly few papers on the effects of Canadian welfare system. In an early paper Allen
(1993) found large and significant effects of welfare benefits on single motherhood. A recent paper by Fortin,
Lacroix, and Drolet (2004) also report significant effects of welfare benefits on duration of welfare spells.
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in the U.S. was largely limited to single mothers, Canadian welfare programs, in principle
at least, required that recipients be neither single nor parents; these programs also benefit
married parents as well as married and unmarried childless adults. Our empirical analysis
shows a single parent with no earnings and one child receives about 82% higher transfers in
Canada than in the U.S. Also, under the U.S. system the effect of an extra child on single
parents’ income is more significant. While in the U.S. a single mother with no children gets
about 25% more transfer income when she has one child, the same number is only 19% in
Canada.
Our empirical analysis also shows that there are important differences between the U.S.
and Canada in terms of single motherhood. In 1994, about 24% of children below age 8 was
living with single mothers in the U.S., while the same figure was only 17% in Canada. For
older children (between ages 9 and 18), the difference was even more striking: 25% versus
15%. Hence, both single-parenthood and marital instability were quite more prevalent in
the U.S. than in Canada. Such differences raise a natural question: how much of them can
be explained by differences in welfare programs?
We use a model of marriage, fertility and investment on children to simulate the long-run
outcomes of a change from universal to targeted welfare policies. We first ask if Canada had
adopted a social policy similar to that which prevailed until recently in the U.S., would the
number of children with single-parents in Canada have looked more like that of the U.S.? In
order to answer this question, we first simulate our model economy so that income inequality
and welfare recipiency in the steady-state equilibrium follow the same patterns with respect
to family structure as in the Canadian data. We then simulate the Canadian economy under
alternative social policies and compare the long-term distribution of children across different
family types in economies that are identical except for the parameters of the government
transfer policies.
The basic policy differences we consider are: 1) eligibility, 2) dependence of transfers
on the number of children, and 3) average level of transfers. We find that these policy
differences can account for the gap between Canada and the U.S. in proportion of children
with single parents. We then ask which type of policy is more effective in helping children
Recently, Canadian Self-Sufficieny project, an experimental reform to Welfare in Canada, generated a large
body of literature — see, among others, Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2006), Zabel, Schwartz, and Donald
(2006), and Wilk, Boyle, Dooley, and Lipman (2006).
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from poor families. Our results show that the Canadian policy is more effective in making
poor children better off than a U.S.-type policy. Furthermore, most of the disadvantage
of a U.S.-type policy comes from the subsidy to fertility. Why does the implicit subsidy
to fertility have a disequalizing effect? As in Knowles (1999), even small increases in the
fertility differential between poor and rich parents will have strong effects on the steady-state
income distribution when productivity levels are persistent across generations.
Finally, we ask which one of the policies that we consider is the most preferred one.
Although the children from poor families receive higher human capital investment under the
Canadian policy, this policy is more expensive since it requires a higher tax collection as
well. Interestingly, it turns out that, except for the poorest 20% of the population, agents in
our model economy prefer a welfare system that targets single mothers (as the U.S. system
does), yet does not (unlike the U.S. system) make transfers dependent on the number of
children.
It is important to note that we solve for the equilibrium of the marriage market under
each policy. Thus we not only account for how the marriage and divorce decisions of women
might respond to welfare programs, but we also incorporate the response of men to the effects
of welfare on marriage prospects. In the model, family structure affects children’s outcomes
by changing the optimal shares of time and income devoted to investment in children’s
human capital. For understanding poverty, an important feature of our model is that it
distinguishes among children of two-parent families, children from divorced parents, and
those whose parents were never married. This is critical for the exercise in question because
empirical studies, e.g. McLanahan and Sandefur (1994), suggest that children’s outcomes
as adults (such as employment and wages) and teenage fertility depend at least as much on
family structure as they do on family income.5
We focus in this paper on policies that prevailed until mid-1990s. This choice is motivated
by the significant changes in social policies on both sides of the border after mid-1990’s. A
major change in U.S. was the introduction of lifetime time limits on welfare recipiency after
1996 reform. More importantly, each state is now given much more freedom in policy design
which make an aggregate portrait of current system very difficult. The welfare reform in
5 In a related paper, Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2000), we show that parental investment in
children’s human capital is central for understanding why large increases in rates of single-motherhood
persisted long after welfare payments had stabilized in the U.S.
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Canada wasn’t as clear-cut as it was in U.S., although the welfare system became “leaner
and meaner” during the last decade (see National Council of Welfare (1997) and Battle and
Mendelson (2001)). Because our analysis is confined to steady-states, we cannot draw from
it any predictions regarding the immediate effects of such changes.6 Greenwood, Guner, and
Knowles (2000) show, however, that when a similar theory is used to model the transition
path between social policies, it turns out that the effects of AFDC on fertility and investment
in children’s human capital induces substantial inertia in the economy. This suggests that
the type of simulation-based analysis developed here may be essential for the design of social
policy as it may take many years for the effects of real-life policies to become evident.
Our approach is complementary to the standard empirical approach in that we build into
the model the types of responses that are difficult to observe directly, and see whether the
model’s output is consistent with the relationships we observe in the data. While our formu-
lation of the policy differences is simplistic, our approach treats the effects of different policy
regimes on the behavior and composition of households in terms of the optimal responses
of individual agents, both to the policy parameters, and to each other. The emphasis on
marriage-market equilibrium makes it difficult to incorporate more realistic policies, but al-
lows us to address directly the incentive issues that have surrounded public debate regarding
the effect of these programs on the composition of the population by household structure.
The model here is based on the general framework developed in Greenwood, Guner, and
Knowles (2003). The current paper is part of the growing literature on quantitative models
of family; see, among others, Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000), Regalia and Ríos-Rull
(1999), Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2002), Chade and Ventura (2002), Fernandez, Guner,
and Knowles (2005) and Da-Rocha and Fuster (forthcoming). This paper is also related
to recent papers that focus on the labor-market effects of social policies in an equilibrium
framework. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), for example, analyze the effects of tuition
subsidies within a general equilibrium model with an explicit college enrollment margin
and show that the effects can be much smaller than the ones reported in previous partial
equilibrium analysis. Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2003) evaluate the labor market effects of the
Canadian Self-sufficiency Project, and show that partial and general equilibrium effects of
such a program can be quite different.
6For evaluations of these recent reforms see Meyer and Sullivan (2004) for the U.S. and Brzozowski (2005)
for Canada.
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In the next section, we compare income inequality, social policies, and family structures
in the two countries. This is followed first by a formal development of the model and then
by a description of the procedure used to calibrate the model to Canadian data. We then
evaluate the effects of introducing an AFDC-style policy.
2. Income and Family Structure in the U.S. and Canada
It is well documented that income distribution in the U.S. is more unequal than in Canada.
Gini coefficient for the household disposable income per equivalent adult was 0.368 in the
U.S. and 0.287 in Canada in 1994, and while the households at the bottom 10% of the
income distribution had about 34% of median income in the U.S. the same number for
Canada was 47% (Gottshalk and Smeeding, 2000). Social policies play an important role in
these differences. According to Gottshalk and Smeeding (2000) while earnings distribution
for the U.S. and Canada are similar at the lower tail, the households in Canada enjoy a
substantially higher post tax transfer income.
Comparing social policies in the U.S. and Canada is a complex task, partly because there
are many different ways policies might vary on paper, but also because poor families can
benefit from a multitude of social programs, some of which are national in scope, like food
stamps in the U.S. and child tax credits in Canada, while others, like welfare payments, vary
according to the local jurisdictions, such as city, state and province. Furthermore, policies
that are similar on paper may be administered quite differently across different jurisdictions,
so that assembling an accurate picture of the social policy within each country is actually an
ill-defined task. Nevertheless, it is clear that the differences across countries are much larger
than the differences within countries, so some abstraction is justified.7
In this section, we proceed by measuring the social policies in terms of the transfer income
actually reported by households in representative household surveys. Social transfers include
old-age or retirement benefits, child or family allowances, training allowances, unemployment
7This view is also supported by the work of Blank and Hanratty (1993). They show that while there
exists substantial variation in social programs within each country, these intra-country differences generate
only small changes in poverty rates. The potential effects of cross-country differences on the other hand are
much more significant.
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benefits and non-cash benefits, such as food and housing and means-tested social assistance,
such as welfare.
Given household survey data for both countries, our approach is to estimate how transfer
income depends on the earnings, marital status, and family size of the recipients. This
procedure results in an aggregate portrait of transfer payments in each country, and this is
essential for identifying the key differences in social policy between the two countries, as well
as for evaluating our simulation results.8
The data are from the 1994 household surveys disseminated by the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS). The U.S. data is an extract from the 1994 Current Population Survey and the
Canadian data from the 1994 Survey of Consumer Finances.9 More recent data is available,
but the U.S. system has been changing rapidly over the last few years as support for welfare
reform grew, and many states had changed their policies even before the reformed welfare
system Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) replaced AFDC in 1996. Hence
the year 1994 was chosen because it seemed more likely to reflect a longer-run outcome from
the characteristic welfare system of the U.S., rather than the new policy. In all calculations,
Canadian dollars were converted to U.S. by dividing by 1.2, a number drawn from the 1994
purchasing power party (PPP) index disseminated by the World Bank.
Table 1 shows basic characteristics of the household samples for each country. Households
were included in our sample if they had children. Our data includes the ages of the three
youngest children. The total number of children in the household is available, though not the
total children ever born to each parent.10 In Table 1 households were classified as belonging
to Period 0 if the age of the youngest child was less than 8. If the youngest child was
between 9 and 18, then the household was classified as Period 1. This division reflects the
compressed life cycle structure of the model to be developed here. Because Canadian data
does not distinguish between divorced women and never married mothers, the marital status
8This approach is not without shortcomings from an econometric perspective since the decision of a
rational agent whether to become a welfare recipient generally depends on both the generosity of the benefits
and the outside opportunities.
9These are stratified samples, so the data analysis is based on the household weights included with each
survey.
10In order to more accurately reflect the implications of social policy for children, the samples were
reweighted by taking the product of the household weight and the number of children.
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of parents was partitioned between married and single. Thus the single category includes
widows, never-married women, and divorced women.
The table reveals a number of significant differences between the two countries. The key
differences between countries concern the distribution of children across family structure. In
the U.S., 23% of period-0 children live with single parents, compared to 17% in Canada.
Even more striking is the growth in the share of U.S. kids with single parents as the children
age: 25% of U.S. children over the age of 9 live with single parents, compared to 15% in
Canada. Thus not only is single-parenthood more common in the U.S., but children in two-
parent families are at a higher risk of suffering a household breakup in the U.S. The income
of single-parent families is roughly the same in both countries. The average level of transfers
to these families is higher in Canada, but this difference is not statistically significant, due
to the high standard deviation of this statistic. Married families however receive on average
a much lower amount of income from government transfers in the U.S. than in Canada.
In assessing the significance of these income differences, it is important to bear in mind
that both parental income and family structure have significant effects on the future income
of the children. In the U.S. for instance, Stokey (1996) argues, on the basis of a number
of empirical studies, that the intergenerational correlation of income is on the order of 0.7.
For Canada, Colak (2006) reports higher degrees of mobility across generations, but note
that mobility is substantially less among low-income families. According to McLanahan and
Sandefur (1994), the effect of being the child of a single parent in the U.S. is substantial,
and they report that only about a half of this effect is explained by the lower income of
single-parent families.
The observed patterns of social policy so far do not imply that U.S. policy favors single
parents at the expense of married: it may be simply that married parents, having higher
incomes, are much less likely to apply for welfare. This point is addressed in Table 2, which
displays the coefficients estimated by regressing social transfer income for each country on
household characteristics.
These results in Table 2 make a number of points about the difference between the two
countries. First, it is clear that the Canadian system is much more generous than the U.S.
system. Transfer income of a single parent with no earnings and one child, for example, is
about 82% higher in Canada. Table 2 also implies the second point, which is that under the
U.S. system the effect of an extra child on single parents income is more significant. While
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in the U.S. a single mother with no children gets about 25% more transfer income when she
has one child, the same number is only 19% in Canada. Finally, being single results in a
higher transfer in the U.S. than in Canada.
Thus the data, even at this cursory level of analysis, reflects the basic patterns that
motivate this paper: marital instability appears to be much more common in the U.S.
and the social policy of the U.S. seems more targeted towards single mothers than married
parents.
Finally, Table 3 shows the relationship between female earnings and fertility in the data.
In both countries number of children a female has declines with her earnings and the effect
of female earnings on fertility is similar in two countries, although and the level of fertility
is higher in the U.S. than in Canada. Note that the level of fertility is quite low (even for
age interval 36-45) in Table 3, since the calculations are based on the number of children in
the household and not on the number of children ever born.
3. The Model
The basic structure of the model is based on Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003). The
economy is populated by overlapping generations that live two periods as children and two
periods as adults. We refer to the first and second periods of adulthood as young and old
below. The mass of each of these age groups is equally divided between a continuum of males
and one of females, distinguished by their productivity levels (types). Let the productivity
of agents be denoted by x for females, and by z for males and assume that they are contained
in the finite sets X = {x1, x2, . . . , xN} and Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zN} . Each adult is endowed with
one unit of time.
On becoming young adults (after two periods with their children), agents learn their
productivity levels and meets potential spouses from the same cohort. Potential couples
then draw a random match quality, denoted by γ ∈ G = {γ1, γ2, ..., γM}. At this point, the
productivity of each potential partner is common knowledge, as is the quality of their match.
If both parties agree, a marriage ensues; otherwise both remain single. At the start of the
second period, each agent learns her next-period productivity, and if married, that of her
spouse as well as the future match quality. Married agents then decide whether to stay
together or divorce. There is no remarriage for divorced agents. At this time, agents who
9
remained unmarried in the first period meet new potential partners (among those who also
remained single in the first period) and can choose to marry.
A newly matched couple, young or old, draws its match quality from the following dis-
tribution
Pr [γ = γi] = Γ(γi).
For a married young couple, the match quality in the second period, γ0, depends on the
initial draw and represented by
Pr
£
γ0 = γj | γ = γi
¤
= Λ(γj | γi)
After the matching decisions of the first period, young married couples and young single
females decide how many children to have, how much to work, and how much of the mother’s
time and family income should be spent on educating the children. Young males simply
decide how much to work. Hence, whether married or single, males allocate their time
between leisure and labor, while that of females is allocated across labor, leisure and the
nurture of the children.11 Children are not differentiated by sex until they become adults.
Let k denote the number of children; we assume that k ∈ K = {0, 1, ...,K}. Similarly, after
the matching decisions of the second period, households decide how to allocate their time
and income. We assume that females can have children only when they are young and if their
parents get divorced, children stay with their mothers. There is a child support payment
system in effect. A divorced male has to pay π percent of his second period income per child
that he has to support.
Education per child in a family with k children is an increasing, deterministic function of
parental spending on education, denoted by d, and the nurture time of the mother, denoted
by t, and is represented by
e = Q (t, d, k) .
Consumption per capita of a household with income level Y that has a adults and k kids is
given by
c =
1
Ψ(a, k)
Y,
11Including father’s time allocation to children’s education would have been too burdensome computation-
ally. Empirical studies suggest mothers spend much more time with children than fathers do in the U.S. —
see, for example, Juster and Stafford (1985).
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where Ψ(a, k) is the adult-equivalent size of a household with a adults and k children.
Agents’ per period utility function depends on c, k, e, and γ (if married) and are given
by
F (c, e, k, 1− l − t, γ) =
 νc (c) + νe (e, k) + ν
¡
1− l − t− φfk
¢− γ, if married
νc (c) + νe (e, k) + ν
¡
1− l − t− φfk
¢
, if single
,
for females. Females put l units of their time to market work and t units of their time to
child care. There is also a fixed time cost of having k children, denoted by φfk. Note that
both married and single females can have children so both e and k enters into their utility
function. Similarly, the utility function for males is given by
M (c, e, k, 1− n, γ) =
 uc (c) + ue (e, k) + u (1− n− φmk)− γ, if marrieduc (c) + u (1− n) . if single .
Note that a single (or divorced) male does not care about the human capital investment of
children. Males simply allocate n units of their time to market work and face (if married)
a fixed time cost of having k children. We assume that the household decisions of married
couples are determined by the Nash solution to the fixed-threat bargaining game in which
the threat point is the value of being single.12
In the first period of adult life, the probability of different productivity realizations depend
on the education received during childhood and are denoted by
Pr [x = xi | e] = Πx (xi|e) and Pr [z = zi | e] = Πz (zi|e) ,
where e = e−1 + e−2 is the total human capital investment that a child receives during
his/her childhood (which depends on the marital history of his/her mother). The probability
distributions Πx (xi|e) and Πz (z|e) are stochastically increasing in e in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance.13
12There is a large literature on different approaches to households decision making. See Del-Boca and
Flinn (2006) for a recent review and empirical evidence in favor of Nash Bargaining solution.
13We do not differentiate between early and late education in order to reduce computational burden. See
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and Caucutt and Lochner (2005) for models of human capital accumulation
in which this distinction is explicitly modeled.
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The productivity in the second period of adult life does not depend directly on childhood
education, but rather on the initial productivity draw, and given by
Pr [x0 = xj | x = xi] = ∆x(xj|xi) and Pr [z0 = zj | z = zi] = ∆z(zj|zi),
where x0 and z0 denote next period’s productivity levels.
Finally, each household can receive welfare payments in the economy. Welfare payments
that a household receives depend on the family type, number of children, and family income.
For households with no labor income, we denote by wg(k), wb, and wm(k) the guarantee
income level for a single female, a single male and a married couple, respectively. As labor
income increases, however, welfare payments are reduced at rate r. Welfare payments are
financed by a lump sum tax τ on households.We assume that households who are on welfare
do not pay this lump-sum tax. We also assume that divorced males’ welfare payments are
subject to child support payments. Given these assumptions, income of a young single female
of type x who has k kids and works l units is given by wg(k) + xl(1− r) if she is on welfare
and by xl − τ if she is out of welfare. Similarly, for a divorced female who has k children
and her ex-husbands has zn units of income, her income is given by xl + πknz − τ if she is
out of welfare and by wg(k) + (1− r)xl + πknz if she is on welfare.
4. Equilibrium
Since agents live for two periods, second period decisions are rather straightforward. We
start by characterizing old agents’ problems and then, given the values assigned to the
second period outcomes, define the value functions for the first period.
4.1. Single Old
A single old female can be never married or divorced. For a never-married female, individual
state is given by her type, x, and the number of children she has, k. Divorced agents receive
child support payments from their ex-husbands so the current productivity of their ex-
husband, z, is a also a state variable. Problem of a divorced female is given by
G2(x, k, z) = max
l,t,d
F (c, e, k, 1− l − t, 0) (Pg2)
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subject to
c = Ψ(1, k)max{xl + πzN s2 (z, k)k − d− τ , wg(k)(1− r)xl + πzN s2 (z, k)k − d}]
and
e = Q(t, d, k),
where the function N s2 (z, k) denotes the labor supply of a single male who has k children
from his first period marriage. For a never-married old female, the problem is simply given
by setting z = 0.
The value of being a single old male is given by the following problem
B2(z, k) = max
n
M(c, 0, 0, 1− n, 0) (Pb2)
subject to
c = max{zn(1− πk)− τ , (wb + (1− r)zn)(1− πk)}.
where k denotes the number of children for whom he has to pay child support. Note that for
a never-married old male, k = 0. Let N s2 (z, k) be the labor supply decision associated with
this problem.
4.2. Married Old
Consider a couple of type (x, z, γ, k) that is married at the start of the second married and
has been married in the first period as well. Their problem is given by
max
l,t,n,d
[F (c, e, k, 1− l − t, γ)−G2(x, k, z)]× [M(c, e, k, 1− n, γ)−B2(z, k)] (Pm2)
subject to
c = Ψ(2, k)max{xl + zn− d− τ , wm(k) + (1− r)(xl + zn)− d},
and
e = Q(t, d, k).
Here B2(z, k) and G2(x, k, z) are the threat points for the husband and wife. They are the
values of being single in the second period, and are given by the solutions to the old single
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agent problems, (Pg2) and (Pb2). Let the resulting utility levels for an old husband and
wife in a (x, z, γ, k)-marriage, or the values for M and F in (P2m) evaluated at the optimal
choices be represented by H2(x, z, γ, k) and W2(x, z, γ, k).
Each party faces a decision: should s/he choose married or divorced life for the period.
A married female will remain married if and only if W2(x, z, γ, k) ≥ G2 (x, k, z) . Similarly, a
married male will remain so if and only if H2(x, z, γ, k) ≥ B2 (z, k) . The matching decision of
an age-2 couple who is considering divorce is then given by the following indicator function:
Im2 (x, z, γ, k) =
 1, if W2(x, z, γ, k) ≥ G2(x, k, z)and H2(x, z, γ, k) ≥ B2(z, k)0, otherwise, (I2)
The problem of a couple who has just matched at the start of the second period is identical
to (Pm2), with k = 0 in B2(z, k) and z = 0 in G2(x, k, z). Let Is2(x, z, γ, k) be the indicator
function for a newly-matched couple in the second period.
4.3. Young
Consider first a young female of type x who meets a young male of type z in the marriage
market and that their match quality is γ. Suppose that the expected lifetime utility of single
life for the female is G1(x) while the expected lifetime utility from marriage is W1(x, z, γ).
She will choose to get marry if W1(x, z, γ) ≥ G1(x), and to remain single otherwise. Let
B1(z) and H1(x, z, γ) denote the corresponding first period values for males. Since her
partner faces the same decision, the marriage will occur if and only if W1(x, z, γ) ≥ G1(x)
and H1(x, z, γ) ≥ B1(z).
How is G1(x) determined? The value of being a young single female of type x, G1(x), is
the sum of current utility and expected future utility, which in turn depends on the values
of single life and married life in the second period. It is given by
G1(x) = max
c,e,d,l,t,k
{F (c, e, k, 1− l − t, 0) + βE{W2(x0, z0, γ0, k)Is2(x0, z0, γ0, k) (Pg1)
+G2(x
0, k)[1− Is2(x0, z0, γ0, k)]},
subject to
c =
1
Ψ(a, k)
max{wg(k) + (1− r)xl − d, xl − d− τ},
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and
e = Q(t, d, k).
The term E{W2(x0, z0, γ0, k)Is2(x0, z0, γ0, k) +G2(x0, k)[1− Is2(x0, z0, γ0, k)]} represents the ex-
pected value of entering into second period as a single female. A single female of type x will
have a new productivity draw x0, meet a single male of type z0, and draw a match quality
γ0. A similar problem determines the value of being a young single male, B1(z), as
B1(z) = max
c,n
{M(c, 0, 0, 1− n, 0) + βE{H2(x0, z0, γ0, k)Is2(x0, z0, γ0, k) (Pb1)
+B2(z
0)[1− Is2(x0, z0, γ0, k)]},
subject to
c = max{wb + (1− r)zn, zn− τ},
where the term E{H2(x0, z0, γ0, k)Is2(x0, z0, γ0, k) + B2(z0)[1 − Is2(x0, z0, γ0, k)]} now captures
the probability of meeting a type-x0 female with k kids.
The decision problem facing a young married couple indexed by (x, z, γ) is
max
c,e,k,l,t,n
{F (c, e, k, 1− l − t, γ) + βE[W2(x0, z0, γ0, k)Im2 (x0, z0, γ0, k) (Pm1)
+G2(x
0, k)[1− Im2 (x0, z0, γ0, k)]−G1(x)}
×{M(c, e, k, 1− n, γ) + βE[H2(x0, z0, γ0, k)Im2 (x0, z0, γ 0, k)
+B2(z
0, k)Im2 (x
0, z0, γ 0, k)]−B1(z)},
subject to
c =
1
Ψ(a, k)
max{wm(k) + (xl + zn)(1− r)− d, xl + zn− τ − d}
and
e = Q(t, d, k).
Here G1(x) and B1(z) represent the female’s and male’s threat points defined in problems
(Pg1) and (Pb1).
The maximized value of the first term in braces gives the value of being in a (x, z, γ)
marriage for the female, W1(x, z, γ), while the second term yields H1(x, z, γ). Once we
have these first period values, we can define a marriage indicator for the first period as
I1(x, z, γ) = 1 if and only if W1(x, z, γ) ≥ G1(x) and H1(x, z, γ) ≥ B1(z).
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Since we assume x and z take values from finite sets, let Φ1(xi) and Ω1(zi) be the distri-
bution of female and male agents who participate in the first period’s marriage market, and
Φ2(xi, k) and Ω2(zi) be the distribution of female and male agents who participate in the
second period’s marriage market. First, note that the second period distributions, Φ2(xi, k)
and Ω2(zi), together with transition functions for x and z, i.e. ∆x and ∆z, define the ex-
pectations in problems (Pg1), (Pb1) and (Pm1). Therefore, given Φ2(xi, k) and Ω2(zi), the
values of being married and single in the first period, i.e. G1(x), B1(z), W1(x, z, γ), and
H1(x, z, γ), can be calculated. Second, the values functions G2, B2, W2 and H2 are deter-
mined trivially since agents live only for two periods. Third, given these value functions,
marriage indicators, I1(x, z, γ), Is2(x, x, γ, k), and I
m
2 (x, x, γ, k) can be constructed. Finally,
given the marriage indicator functions and the education decisions associated with first and
second period value functions, we can update Φ1(xi), Ω1(zi), Φ2(xi, k) and Ω2(zi).
This updating involves two parts. The first part is trivial. The distribution of agents in
the first period marriage market, i.e. Φ1(xi) and Ω1(zi), first period marriage indicators, and
fertility decisions are used to determine Φ2(xi, k) and Ω2(zi). The second period distributions
simply consist of agents who decided not to or could not to get married in the first period.
The second part involves updating Φ1(xi) and Ω1(zi). Given marital histories we can use
fertility and education decision to update Φ1(xi) and Ω1(zi) in line with transition functions
Πx (xi|e) and Πz (zi|e) . This updating procedure is characterized formally in the Appendix.
A steady state equilibrium for this economy consists of a fixed point between household
decisions about marriage, fertility and education, and the distribution of agents in the first
and second period marriage market. We solve this fixed point problem numerically.
5. Computational Analysis
The first step in the computational analysis is to select functional forms and parameterize
the model to be able to generate a set of observables regarding the distribution of children
by parent’s marital status and income distribution by family structure. To this end, we first
set N = 13 and choose the grid points (values of xi’s and zj’s) two standard deviations
around the mean of log wages that are reported in Table 4. In the benchmark calibration,
people can choose to have kids from the following set k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, which is the
smallest non-binding set for k. We restrict the number of match quality shocks to two, i.e.
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γ ∈ G = {γ1, γ2}, and set the stochastic structure to be iid, i.e.
Pr[γ = γ1] = Pr[γ = γ2] = 0.5 and Pr[γ
0 = γ1|γ = γ1] = Pr[γ0 = γ2|γ = γ2] = 0.5.
Second, there are few parameters that can be chosen to be consistent with available
empirical evidence. We interpret a model period as ten years and set β = 0.67 which
corresponds to a 4% yearly interest rate. Economies of scale in household consumption is
given by
c =
1
Ψ(a, k)
Y =
1
(a + bk)θ
Y =
1
(a+ 0.4k)0.5
Y.
There is a large empirical literature on household economies of scale. We take the functional
form for Ψ(a, k) from Cutler and Katz (1992), and set b and θ to what they consider as
consensus and intermediate values in the literature, respectively.
Third, we set π = 0.0607, hence a divorced male pays about 6.1% of his income child
support payments per child he is supporting. According to Bertrand, Hornick, Paetsch,
and Basa (2003), based on more than 33,000 divorce cases between 1998 and 2002 period,
the mean monthly child support payment was $544 and the mean annual income of paying
parents was $43,532. Hence, a divorced father paid about 15% his income as child support
payments.14 Of course, unlike our model economy, some parents do not pay the child pay-
ments that are due. According to Bertrand, Hornick, Paetsch, and Basa (2003), about 10%
of divorce cases and associated child support payments were contested. Taking this as a
measure of potential non-compliance by ex-husbands, and assuming two kids per divorce (as
in our benchmark economy), effective payment per child is about 6.07%.
Finally, we borrow the parameters for the child quality production function from Green-
wood, Guner, and Knowles (2003):
e = Q (t, d, k) =
µ
t
kχ1
¶αµ
d
kχ2
¶1−α
=
µ
t
k0.4
¶0.5µ
d
k0.5
¶1−0.5
=
1
k0.45
t0.5d0.5.
The rest of the parameter values are calibrated to match a set of targets from the data.
We assume that momentary utility functions are given by
F (c, e, k, 1− l − t, γ) ≡ c
σ1
σ1
+
kσ2
σ2
eσ3f
σ3f
+ δ
(1− l − t− φfk)
σ4
σ4
− γ
14Fathers had custody in only about 8% of cases.
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for females, and by
M(c, e, k, 1− n, γ) ≡ c
σ1
σ1
+
kσ2
σ2
eσ3m
σ3m
+ δ
(1− l − t− φmk)
σ4
σ4
− γ.
for males.
We assume that ∆x(xj|xi) and ∆z(zj|zi) are discreet approximations to log normal dis-
tributions. These distributions map first period productivity levels into second period pro-
ductivity levels, and determine the volatility of earnings from the first to the second model
period. We assume that for a female with first period productivity level x, her next period
productivity x0 is a draw from a lognormal distribution with mean 2.29(1−ρ)+ρ lnx and stan-
dard deviation s. Similarly, a male’s productivity evolves to z0 ∼ lnN(2.65[1−ρ]+ρ ln z, s).
Hence, both males and females have on average a ρ% chance of keeping their current pro-
ductivity and (1− ρ)% chance of moving to the mean productivity.
We also assume that Πx (xi|e) and Πx (zi|e) are discreet approximations to log normal
distributions. These functions map accumulated education during childhood, e = e−2+ e−1,
into first period’s productivity levels. We assume that Πx (xi|e) is a discreet approximation
to log normal distribution with mean mxeη and standard deviation of se; and similarly
Πz (zi|e) a discreet approximation to a log normal distribution with meanmzeη and standard
deviation of se.
The parameters we need to determine are then: eight utility parameters, {σ1, σ2, σ3f , σ3m,
φm, φf , δ, σ4}, two match quality levels, {γ1, γ2},welfare policy parameters, {wm(k), wg(k), wb, r},
parameters determining stochastic structure of productivity levels between periods 1 and 2,
{ρ, s}, and parameters that map childhood histories in education into first period produc-
tivity levels, {mz,mx, η, se}. We calibrate these parameters to match an equal number of
targets from the data.
1. In the data, about 17% of younger children and about 15% of older children live with
single parents. Two match quality levels, γ1 = 0 and γ2 = 1.439, are chosen to generate
these statistics.
2. In the data, incomes differ significantly by marital status. On average, a single mother
earns about 24% of the income of a married couple when she is young and about 32%
of income of a married couple when she is old. The curvature of the utility from
consumption, σ1 = 0.48, is picked to generate this match.
18
3. In the data, single females use about 12% of their time for the market work when they
are young and about 16% of it when they are old (assuming a weekly time endowment
of 122 hours). Parameter of the utility from consumption, σ4 = 0.255, is picked to
match these statistics.
4. In the data, transfer incomes amount to about 10.64% of married couples income in
the first period. The labor supply parameter δ = 2.7 is picked to generate the right
amount of welfare dependence for married couples in the first model period.
5. The overall fertility level is 2 per female in the model (which generates a stationary
population structure). Low income families tend to have more children than high
income families; the dependence of fertility on income generated by the model is shown
in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the relation between female earnings and fertility in the
model and in the data (for age interval 25-35 as documented in Table 3).15 We set
σ2 = 0.302 to get the overall fertility level of 2, and picked the remaining parameters
that determine fertility, σ3m = 0.325, σ3f = 0.22, φm = 0.025 and φf = 0.05, to
generate a relation between income and fertility similar to what we observe in the
data.
6. To calibrate ∆x and ∆z, we set ρ = 0.69, i.e. both males and females have on average
a 69% chance of keeping their current productivity and 31% chance of moving to the
mean productivity level. In the data, transfer incomes amount to about 9.49.% of
married couples income in the second period. Parameter ρ was chosen to generate
the same level of welfare dependence in the model economy. Note that given welfare
dependence in the first period for married couples, welfare dependence in the second
period is determined by the mass of households at the low end of the productivity
distribution. This allows us to pin down the level of income mobility between two
periods. Given ρ, the parameter s is then selected so that the standard deviation of
second period distribution of female and male types in the steady state are consistent
with the data in Table 4, i.e. standard deviation of log earnings is about 0.63 for males
and 0.67 for females.
7. To calibrate Πx and Πz, we set mz = 14, mx = 9.86, se = 0.4, and η = 0.525. These
15Data source for Figure 1, as it was for Table 3, is Luxembourg Income Study.
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four parameters were chosen so that the initial (period 1) distribution of female and
male types in the steady state, i.e. Φ1(xi) and Ω1(zj), are consistent with the data, i.e.
the four moments of these distributions match the ones reported in Table 4.
8. Finally, in order to calibrate our welfare parameters, we use Canadian data on welfare
payments. According to the National Council of Welfare (2000), in British Columbia,
Ontario, and Quebec welfare incomes constitute about 48% of the single mothers’
average income. We set wg(k) = wg = 1.3 which is about 48% of average income for
single females in the benchmark economy. Then we used the ratio of welfare payments
for single mothers to that for single males and married in the data to set wb = 0.65
and wm(k) = wm = 1.8.16 We set r = 0.66 based on the estimate by Charette and
Meng (1994). This variable captures how welfare payments are reduced with household
income and therefore is a summary measure of quite complex rules.17
Table 5 lists the parameter values (except those that are selected to match the statistics
in Table 4) and the corresponding targets. Table 6 compares statistics from Table 1 with
their analogs from the model economy for married and single agents. Overall, the model
generates a good fit with the data on the moments that are most directly linked to family
structure: the share of children by age in single-parent families, the relative earnings of young
married and single mothers, and the relation between female earnings and fertility. The main
divergences between the model results and the data are quantitative rather than qualitative.
Single mothers (especially when young) are less dependent on welfare in the model than they
are in the data. A single mother gets about 47.8% of her income from welfare when young
and 51.75% of it from welfare when old. In contrast, the welfare dependence of young and
old single mothers are 83.7% and 59.7% in the data, respectively. The model also generates
a higher fertility differential between single and married parents than in the data.
16According to Cragg (1996) and Barrett and Cragg (1998), most welfare spells are shorter than 10 years
(a model period), although for single mothers with children spells can be quite long (more than 2 years).
However, Barrett and Cragg (1998) show that more than half of single mothers who exit welfare return to
it after a year.
17The available estimates for the U.S. welfare system are quite varied and range from low values of around
30% by McKinnish, Sanders, and Smith (1999) to much higher rates of 70-90% by Hoynes (1997) and Keane
and Wolpin (2002).
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5.1. Discussion
Table 7 reports additional statistics from the benchmark economy. These statistics highlight
two aspects of our calibration strategy that we did not discuss in detail above. First, in
the simulations we assume that the match quality shocks are iid with Pr[γ = γ1] = Pr[γ =
γ2] = 0.5 and Pr[γ
0 = γ1|γ = γ1] = Pr[γ0 = γ2|γ = γ2] = 0.5. This is undoubtedly
restrictive. However, given that γ1 and γ2 are selected to generate the fraction of children
living with single mothers, the simple life-cycle structure of the model restricts our ability to
generate additional statistics that can be used for calibrating the stochastic structure of math
qualities. After all, the fraction of children living with single mothers is simply determined
by the fertility behavior and the marital status of population. The only additional statistics
that the model generates is the fraction of population who is divorced in the second period. In
the model (see Table 7), about 10% of second period population is divorced. This compares
surprisingly well with the data. According to 1996 Census, about 10% of females between
ages 35 and 59 were divorced.18
Second, we borrow the parameters for Q(k, d, t) from Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles
(2003). Their calibration is based on the fraction of income that single and married parents
spend on their children. In the benchmark economy, married couples spend about 18% of
their income on children while the same number for single parents is about 33%. A simple
calculation from Statistics Canada (1999) show that the model is not far from the data. In
1997, married couples with children spend about 22% of their total consumption expenditure
on children, while the same number for single households were about 28%.19 Given these
18Available at http://www.statcan.ca/english/census96/oct14/law.htm
19In order to calculate spending on children, we take from Statistics Canada (1999), Table 3, total con-
sumption spending as well as spending on food, shelther, household operations, furnishing, clothing, trans-
portation, health, personal care, recreation, reading materials, and education. We consider education as
totally spent on children. For the rest of the items, we allocate 20% of spending in married couple houshe-
olds and 28% of spending in single mother housheolds to children. We arrive at these allocation rules from
our economies of scale parameters. Married couples have 1.8 children in the data, hence weighting children as
0.4 adults, children consume (1.8)(0.4)/(2+(1.8)(0.4)) = 0.20 of household consumption. For single mothers,
who have 1.6 children in the data, we get (1.6)(0.4)/(1+(1.6)(0.4)) = 0.28. By dividing total consumption
of children by total consumption (which includes additional items like spending on alcohol and tobacco), we
find the fraction of total spending on children.
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differences in spending and the number of children (Table 6), the model generates significant
differences in human capital investment on children. In the model economy, human capital
investment per children in married couple household is about 3 times as high as the human
capital investment in single-mother families.
6. Policy Experiments
Given that the model can reproduce the basic features of the Canadian data discussed above,
we now conduct policy simulations in order to compute the impact on family structure and
inequality of moving from the Canadian-style welfare policy of our benchmark model to the
more targeted type of welfare policy that was in effect in the U.S. The basic policy differences
we consider are: 1) eligibility of married women and single men, 2) dependence of transfers
on the number of children, and 3) average level of transfers. In this section, we modify the
benchmark model by introducing these differences sequentially. Our objective is to find out
to what extent such differences could explain the higher proportion of single-parent children
in the U.S., which of these differences is most important for our explanation, and what type
of policy is most effective in making the poor better off in the long run.
The results of these policy experiments are reported in Table 8a together with the data for
the U.S. economy. In Experiment 1, we simply assume that Canada stops providing welfare
payments to married people and single males. Instead only single mothers are eligible for
welfare. As Table 8a demonstrates the first experiment does not affect the number of children
with single mothers. The income inequality measures also remain the same.
In Experiment 2, we make welfare payments for single mothers dependent on the number
of children; in particular we set assume that wg(k) = a + bk. To determine the parameters
a and b, we know from Table 2 that in the U.S. having children increase income of a single
mother (with no additional earnings) by about 25%. Hence, a+b
a
= 1.25.We also require that
under this policy, a single female with 3 children (average number of children that welfare
mothers have in the benchmark economy) receives the same welfare payments as they did
in Experiment 1, i.e. a+ 3b = 1.3. The policy parameters that satisfy these two restrictions
turns out to be wg(k) = 0.748 + 0.184k. The effects of this policy are dramatic: the number
of kids with single mothers and the income gap between single mothers and married couples
widen significantly. Indeed, the average number of children with young single mothers jumps
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to about 31% in the model in contrast to 23% for the U.S. economy. Income inequality also
worsens. A young single mother has now about 19% of married couples income (instead of
22%). The same statistics for an old single mother is 23% (instead of 27%).
The U.S. welfare payments, however, are not as generous as the Canadian ones. In
Experiment 3, we reduce the welfare payments to reflect the average AFDC and food stamps
payments in the U.S. We set wg(k) = 0.575 + 0.141k, where a single mother (with 1 and 3
children) receive about 10% of average income as welfare payments. In this final experiment
the average number of children with young single mothers is about 22.7%, a number very
close to 23.12% for the U.S. economy. The model creates, however, much less single mothers
for the second period than the U.S. economy. The fraction of children with an old single
mother is about 16.52% in the model whereas it is 25.32% in the U.S.
In order to understand results in Table 8a, Table 8b repeats the same analysis keeping
the marital decisions at their benchmark economy.20 A comparison between Tables 8a and
8b shows that although Experiment 1 does not affect the fraction of children with single
mothers, there are two opposite forces in play. If we kept the marital decisions in their
benchmark values, the number of children with single mothers would be smaller than the
benchmark economy (16.68% versus 17.10%). This occurs as non-marital fertility declines
slightly from 2.66 to 2.65 kids per single mother. Despite the decline in non-marital fertility,
the fraction of kids with single mothers does not decline much with Experiment 1, since this
decline is compensated by higher degree of single motherhood. Since married couples do not
receive welfare anymore, marriage is less attractive for those low productivity females who
are matched with low productivity males. These same females, however, prefer to have fewer
children as this increases the expected value of married life (in particular married life out-of
-welfare) next period.
For Experiments 2 and 3, Table 8b shows that both marriage and fertility decisions move
in the same direction. The non-marital fertility increases from 2.66 to 3.7 with Experiment 2
and from 2.66 to 3.4 with Experiment 2. Table 8b also shows that the fertility decisions plays
the major role in these experiments. Even if marriage decisions were intact, Experiment
2 would still increase the fraction of children with young single mothers to about 26.7%.
20For this experiment we change the parameter values but assume that marriages are determined exoge-
nously according to indicator functions, I1, Im2 and I
s
2 from the benchmark economy. Given these marriage
rules agents make all other decisions optimally.
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This is about 70% of the total increase from 17% to 31%. Similarly, Experiment 3 would
make in about 21.0.7% of children living with young single mother (instead of 22.7%) if the
benchmark marriage decisions were kept intact. Indeed, in both Experiments 2 and 3, per
child human capital in single mother households increases. With experiment 2, for examples,
single mothers make 5% more human capital investment on their children than they do in
benchmark economy. This positive effects is however more than compensated by the rise in
the number of kids living in single mother households.
Finally, it is important to note that income differences between single and married house-
holds remain pretty much the same if we keep marriage decisions intact. This should not
be surprising as the productivity distribution of single females remain constant with intact
marriage decisions. In Table 8a, the income inequality worsens as marginal low female shifts
from marriage to single motherhood.
6.1. Effectiveness of Social Policy
In this section we revisit the economies studied in the previous two sections, in order to find
out which social policies are most effective in making poor children better off and reducing
inequality. In Table 9, we show the average education level of children by their percentile
rank in the income distribution (with benchmark values normalized to 100). What is striking
in these results is that the Canadian policy is much more effective than Experiment 3, which
is the policy that most closely resembles AFDC. Parents in all five income quantiles invest
more in children under the Canadian policy than under the AFDC-like policy (those in the
lowest income quantile invest about 8% more, while the ones in the highest quantile invest
about 2% more). Furthermore, most of the disadvantage of AFDC comes from the subsidy
to fertility (Experiment 2). The restriction of welfare to unmarried women does not have
much impact on children’s education.
Table 10 shows that the implications for income inequality are also in line with results in
Table 8a. Experiment 1, the restriction of transfers to the unmarried, minimizes the ratio of
mean income in the highest-income quantile to the mean income in lowest income quantile.
It also minimizes the income gap between married households and single-mother households.
The policy that maximizes inequality is Experiment 2, which is a generous version of the
AFDC policy, with rewards for extra fertility.
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6.2. Preferred Policy
The tax rate implied by the Canadian policy is about 28% higher than the tax required
to pay for Experiment 3. Thus if inequality or children’s education are the predominant
concerns of social policy, then it is clear that the Canadian policy is better suited than the
U.S. policy to address this. However it may be that the average income under the U.S. policy
is sufficiently higher so as to outweigh this advantage.
In Table 11a and 11b, we show the relation between the percentile rank of the household
and their expected utilities in the steady-state economies under different policies.21 These
rankings (again with benchmark values normalized to 100) are the same for men and women
and show that poorest households are best off under the Canadian (Benchmark) policy, while
richer quantiles have the highest utility under the policy that excludes married people from
welfare (Experiment 1). The other policies are never the second choice of these households;
in particular, Experiment 3, which most resembles the former U.S. policy, is ranked third
by all households. The fact that majority of people prefer a welfare policy that targets
single females reflects the cost effectiveness of these policies in helping children raised in
single-mother families. Agents in this economy are better off when these children receive
better education since educational investments determines the steady state productivity
distributions. While agents prefer to be in an economy where single mothers receive welfare,
they do not want to make these welfare payments dependent on the number of children, since
this results in higher fertility and makes the welfare payments per child much less effective.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we asked to what extent the higher rate of single-parent children and larger
income inequality in the U.S. were long-run responses to the differences in the social transfer
regimes in the two countries. Our basic hypothesis is that single-motherhood and long-run
poverty are connected by human capital investment in children and both are affected by
the structure of the welfare policy. The large theoretical and empirical literature on welfare
policies does not tell us whether targeting the most needy groups will reduce or increase the
21The numbers in Table 11 are calculated as the expected lifetime utility of an agent who is randomly
thrown into the model economy.
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rate of single-parent children in the long-run, since there are conflicting effects. It is also not
clear whether fertility targeting is worse or better than marital status targeting.
We constructed an equilibrium model of the interaction between family structure and
social policy. The basic premise is that family structure decisions are not only dependent
on the human capital of the parents, but in turn helps to determine the human capital of
the children. In the model, marriage and divorce decisions depend on the outside options
of both partners, which in turn depend on the decisions of all other adults, because these
determine the probability distribution of potential spouses.
We calibrated the steady-state equilibrium of this model to the Canadian economy on the
basis of an empirical analysis of household survey data drawn from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, 1994. The parameters of the calibrated model were chosen so as to generate the
following features of the data: the distribution of children across dual and single-parent
households, the earnings differential between single and dual parents, a replacement rate of
average fertility, and a pattern of lower fertility for higher-income households. The social
policy was set to resemble an average Canadian welfare policy.
The main result of this paper is that when the social policy in our benchmark economy
is replaced by one that resembles the AFDC policy in the U.S., the fraction of children with
single parents does indeed increase significantly. If we consider only the average proportion
of children, then almost all of the difference between the two countries is explained by
this change in social policy alone. We identify three critical differences between the two
approaches to social policy: compared to the Canadian policy, the AFDC policy tends to
exclude married parents, makes payments more dependent on fertility, and has lower average
levels of payments. We find that these policy differences can account for the higher fraction
of single mothers in the U.S. economy. In particular, while in the benchmark economy
(Canada), about 17% of children live with young single-mothers, the same number jumps to
22.7% when we implement a AFDC style policy. In the U.S. about 23.12% of young (between
ages 0 and 8) lives with single mothers. The changes in welfare policy alone, however, is not
able to generate much higher rate of older (9 to 18 years old) children who live with single
mothers in the U.S.
Our results also suggest that the Canadian policy is more effective than the AFDC-
style policy in helping poor children and in reducing the level of income inequality among
households. The U.S. policy on the other hand is less costly and results in higher average
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income. Nevertheless in terms of ex-ante utility all households in our model economy prefer to
be born into an economy with the Canadian policy than the AFDC-style policy. Interestingly,
while for the poorest households the Canadian policy is the most preferred one, the majority
of households prefers an in-between policy: one that targets single mothers but does not
provides fertility bonuses.22
22Although the emphasis of the analysis has been on differences in welfare policy, it is worth noting that
the model is also amenable to the analysis of other types of policy that affect or respond to family structure,
such as alimony, child-support and other divorce-contingent transfers.
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8. Appendix – Stationary Equilibrium
Let denote an old single mother’s level of human capital investment in her children in problem
(Pg2) by e = Es2(x, k, z), old married couple’s level of human capital investment per child
in problem (Pm2) by e = Em2 (x, z, γ, k). Similarly, let k = K
s(x) be the fertility decision
and e = Es1(x) be the education decision of a young single female in problem (P1g), and let
k = Km(x) be the fertility decision and e = Em1 (x, z, γ) be the education decision of young
married couple in problem (P1m). Then, the average number of children per female in this
economy is given by
k =
NP
i=1
NP
j=1
MP
h=1
Φ1 (xi)Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)K
m(xi, zj, γh)
+
NP
i=1
Φ1 (xi) [1−
NP
j=1
MP
h=1
Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]K
s(xi).
To understand this formula, note that the probability of a type-(xi, zj, γh) marriage between
young adults is Φ1 (xi)Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh). This match will generate K
m(xi, zj, γh)
kids. The odds that a woman will be type xi and remain single are Φ1 (xi) [1−
PN
j=1
PM
h=1
Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]. This woman will haveK
s(xi) children. In a stationary equilibrium
the growth rate of the population, g, will therefore be g =
q
k
2
.
8.1. Steady-State Matching Probabilities
Young Adults: The probabilities of meeting a young female and male of a given type in the
marriage market areΦ1(x) andΩ1(z). To determine these probabilities, letΥmm(xi, zj, γh, xk, zl, γn)
represent the fraction of females who were married in both periods and transited from state
(xi, zj, γh) to (xk, zl, γn). Likewise, let Υ
ss(xi, xk) denote the fraction of females who were
single in both periods, and transited from xi to xk, and Υms(xi, zj, γh, xk, zl) denote the
fraction of females who suffered a marriage breakup, etc. Hence,
Υmm(xi, zj, γh, xk, zl, γn) ≡ Φ1 (xi)Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)Is1(xi, zj, γh)
×Im2 (xk, zl, γn, km)Λ(γn|γh)∆x(xk|xi)∆z(zl|zj),
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Υss(xi, xk) ≡ Φ1 (xi) [1−
NP
j=1
MP
h=1
Γ(γh)Ω1(zj)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]
×∆x(xk|xi)[1−
NP
l=1
MP
n=1
Γ(γn)I
s
2(xk, zl, γn, k
s)Ω2(zl)],
Υms(xi, zj, γh, xk, zl) ≡ Φ1 (xi)Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)Is1(xi, zj, γh)∆x(xk|xi)∆z(zl|zj)
× {
mP
n=1
Λ(γn|γh)[1− Im2 (xk, zl, γn, km)]},
Υsm(xi, xk, zl, γn) ≡ Φ1 (xi) [1−
SP
j=1
mP
h=1
Γ(γh)Ω1(zj)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]
×Is2(xk, zl, γn, ks)Γ(γn)∆x(xk|xi)Ω2(zl), (8.1)
where km ≡ Km(xi, zj, γh) and ks ≡ Ks(xi).
Then, it is easy to see that the odds of meeting a young woman of type xr in the marriage
market are given by
Φ1(xr) = {
P
i,j,k,l,h,n
Πx(xr|Em1 (xi, zj, γh) +Em2 (xk, zl, γn, Km(xi, zj, γh)))
×Υmm(xi, zj, γh, xk, zl, γn)Km(xi, zj, γh)
+
P
i,k
Πx(xr|Es1(xi) +Es2(xk, Ks(xi), 0))Υss(xi, xk)Ks(xi)
+
P
i,j,k,l,h
Πx(xr|Em1 (xi, zj, γh) +Es2(xk,Km(xi, zj, γh), zl))
×Υms(xi, zj, γh, xk, zl)Km(xi, zj, γh)
+
P
i,k,l,n
Πx(xr|Es1(xi) +Em2 (xk, zl, γn, Ks(xi)))
×Υsm(xi, xk, zl, γn)Ks(xi)}/k. (8.2)
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The probability of meeting a type-zr young man is determined analogously:
Ω1(zr) = {
P
i,j,k,l,h,n
Πz(zr|Em1 (xi, zj, γh) +Em2 (xk, zl, γn, Km(xi, zj, γh)))
×Υmm(xi, zj, γh, xk, zl, γn)Km(xi, zj, γh)
+
P
i,k
Πx(zr|Es1(xi) +Es2(xk, Ks(xi), 0))Υss(xi, xk)Ks(xi)
+
P
i,j,k,l,h
Πz(zr|Em1 (xi, zj, γh) +Es2(xk, Km(xi, zj, γh), zl))
×Υms(xi, zj, γh, xk, zl)Km(xi, zj, γh)
+
P
i,k,l,n
Πz(zr|Es1(xi) +Em2 (xk, zl, γn, Ks(xi)))
×Υsm(xi, xk, zl, γn)Ks(xi)}/k.
Old Adults: Next, how are the odds of meeting a single age-2 type-x female with k chil-
dren, Φ2 (x, k), or of a single age-2 type-z male, Ω2 (z) determined in stationary equilibrium?
This depends upon the number of single agents who remain unmarried from the previous
period. So, how many are there? Again, the number of married and single one-period-
old type-xi females are given by Φ1 (xi)
PN
j=1
PM
h=1Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh) and Φ1 (xi) [1−PN
j=1
PM
h=1Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]. Given this supply of one-period-old single females,
the quantity of two-period-old type xk single females will be
PN
i=1∆
x(xk|xi)Φ1 (xi) [1 −PN
j=1
PM
h=1Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)].
Let
N(xi, k) =
 1, if Ks(xi) = k,0, otherwise,
be an indicator function representing the number of children that a single one-year-old female
of type xi has. Then, the odds of drawing a single two-period-old type-xk female with k
children in the marriage market, or Φ2(xk, k), will be given by
Φ2(xk, k) =
PN
i=1N(xi, k)∆
x(xk|xi)Φ1 (xi) [1−
PN
j=1
PM
h=1 Γ(γh)Ω1(zj)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]PN
k=1
PS
i=1∆
x(xk|xi)Φ1 (xi) [1−
PN
j=1
PM
h=1 Γ(γh)Ω1(zj)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]
.
The same formula for the odds of meeting a single two-period-old male of type zl, or for
Ω2 (zl) , reads
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Ω2 (zl) =
PN
j=1 Z(zl|zj)Ω1(zj)[1−
PN
i=1
PM
h=1 Γ(γh)Φ1 (xi) I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]PN
l=1
PN
j=1 Z(zl|zj)Ω1(zj)[1−
PN
i=1
PM
h=1 Γ(γh)Φ1 (xi) I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]
. (8.3)
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TABLE 1: Average Sample Characteristics
US Canada US Canada US Canada US Canada
Observations* 10174 4635 4118 5279 3059 970 1396 949
 % of Kids 76.88 82.69 74.68 84.76 23.12 17.31 25.32 15.24
Family:
  DPI 40201.67 37372 45485 40698.87 16725 17963 21041 21105
 (std. dev.) 26111.65 17747 27969 21853.23 12435 10570 14365 12036
  Fam. Earnings 47609.55 41739 54664 45840.8 11237 10077 17491 13349
 (std. dev.) 38684.35 28061 40642 36560.26 16076 14329 17627 17084
  Govt. Transfers 1743.22 4441.9 1786.7 4350.42 5964.3 8434 4005.4 7962.3
 (std. dev.) 4311.29 5305.1 4478.7 5492.46 5766.4 5811.7 5191.1 6353.8
Kids 2.62 2.03 2.11 2.64 2.77 1.91 1.95 2.32
 (std. dev.) 1.24692 0.8842 0.8396 1.15082 1.5093 0.8455 45.767 22.491
Mother:
Age 33.66 31.77 40.41 38.19 31.26 30.16 38.41 37.39
 (std. dev.) 6.0202 5.1372 5.4107 5.0156 6.8529 6.3745 5.7859 5.6299
   Educ. 12.94 13.3 13.09 12.84 11.64 12.12 12.38 12.29
 (std. dev.) 2.9024 2.319 2.6619 2.474 2.4041 2.4449 2.4859 2.3981
Weekly Hours 22.22 18.81 27.45 21.9 22.52 13.78 30.53 17.95
 (std. dev.) 18.6678 18.193 17.339 18.1763 19.675 18.469 17.687 19.371
   Wage 11.97 11.63 12.35 11.76 9.71 11.99 10.92 12.81
 (std. dev.) 8.7898 7.0344 9.89 7.6254 10.285 6.9128 7.4095 14.633
Father:
Age 35.93 34.28 42.67 40.83 . . . .
 (std. dev.) 6.8999 5.7613 6.5831 5.9225 . . . .
   Educ. 13.11 13.36 13.42 12.93 . . . .
 (std. dev.) 3.2667 2.4845 3.1827 2.7371 . . . .
Weekly Hours 43.25 37.37 42.59 37.54 . . . .
 (std. dev.) 14.1447 17.558 15.006 18.009 . . . .
   Wage 16.83 16.08 18.52 17.54 . . . .
 (std. dev.) 13.461 8.4992 12.698 12.363 . . . .
*Sample observations unweighted; percentages reflect household weights.
SOURCES: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994
Single Parents
Period 2Period 1 Period 2
Married Parents
Period 1
USA Canada
Estimate 709.56 4760
(t-ratio) 6.42 31.09
Estimate 858.04 1281.84
(t-ratio) 30.94 30.33
Estimate 2779 1886.76
(t-ratio) 30.07 13.05
N 16197 11421
TABLE 3: Fertility by Female Earnings in 1994 Survey Data
25-35 36-45 25-35 36-45
mean 1.95 1.68 1.6 1.53
std 52.45 53.31 19.12 20.76
median 2 2 2 2
N 5315 5976 4543 4716
mean 1.34 1.28 1 1.16
std 47.53 49.5 17.06 17.31
median 1 1 1 1
N 1096 1179 716 808
mean 1.04 1.08 0.87 1.15
std 44.17 42.73 17.69 17.76
median 1 1 1 1
N 1088 1159 636 745
mean 0.99 1.09 0.78 1.01
std 44.51 45.72 17.46 17.74
median 1 1 0 1
N 1062 1108 606 742
mean 0.84 1.13 0.78 1.08
std 41.37 44.46 18.06 18.77
median 1 1 0 1
N 1055 1126 620 690
SOURCES: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994
TABLE 2: Social Policy Regression Results
Single Mom
Intercept
Kids
Variables
Age Interval Age Interval
*Dependent variable = total public transfers received. 
The regressions also include age and earnings 
controls. SOURCE: Authors calculations from 
Luxembourg Income Study. 
5
Canada
1
2
3
4
Female 
Earnings 
Quintile
Statistic
USA
Table 4: Log Hourly Wage Distributions
Men Women
Mean 2.65 2.29
Std. 0.63 0.67
SOURCES: Luxembourg Income Study, 1994
Table 5: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Model Data
γ 1 0 Fraction of Kids with Single Mothers (period 1) 17.10% 17.31%
γ 2 1.439 Fraction of Kids with Single Mothers (period 2) 15.23% 15.24%
σ 1 0.480 Single females' Income/Married Couples' Incomes (period 1) 0.22 0.24
σ 2 0.302 Aggregate Fertility
σ 3 f 0.220 Income Fertility Relation
σ 3 m 0.325 Income Fertility Relation
σ 4 0.255 Single females'  labor supply (period 1) 0.12 0.12
φ f 0.05 Income Fertility Relation
φm 0.025 Income Fertility Relation
δ 2.70 Transfer Income/Family Income (married, period 1) 10.89 10.64
ρ 0.690 Transfer Income/Family Income (married, period 2) 9.93 9.49
w g (k) 1.3 Welfare income/average income of single females 0.48 0.48
wm (k) 1.8 welfare payments to married/welfare payments single mothers 1.38 1.38
w b 0.65 welfare payments to single males/welfare payments to single mothers 0.5 0.5
2
Figure 1
Figure 1
Figure 1
Canada
Target
Figure 1
Table 6:  Calibration
Model Canada Model Canada Model Canada Model Canada
Children 82.90 82.69 84.77 84.76 17.10 17.31 15.23 15.24
Fam. Earnings* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.32
Transfers/Income (%) 10.89 10.64 9.93 9.49 47.80 83.70 51.75 59.65
Fertility 1.88 2.03 NA 2.64 2.66 1.91 NA 2.32
Labor Supply
Mother 0.33 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.16
*Canadian data for Fam. Earnings are based on Table 1. The numbers are normalized to 
total family earnings of married couples
** Canadian data for labor supply is based on Table 1. Weekly hours are normalized by 112 hours.
Table 7: Benchmark Economy
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Married 87.31 86.71 0.18 0.18 1.00 1.00
Single 12.69 13.29 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.39
Never Married 2.69 0.35 0.33
Divorced 10.6 0.28 0.40
*As a fraction of young married couples' income 
**As a fraction of household income
Married Parents Single Parents
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Marital Status (%) Spending on Children** Human Capital Investment*
TABLE 8a: Welfare Experiments
Model US Model US Model US Model US
Benchmark Economy
% of Kids 82.90 76.88 84.77 74.68 17.10 23.12 15.23 25.32
Fam. Earnings* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.15 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.37
Expt. 1: restriction to single mothers 
% of Kids 82.97 76.88 85.40 74.68 17.03 23.12 14.60 25.32
Fam. Earnings* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.15 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.37
Expt. 2: Expt. 1 + fertility bonus
% of Kids 69.03 76.88 76.65 74.68 30.97 23.12 23.35 25.32
Fam. Earnings* 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.15 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.37
Expt. 3: Expt. 2 + lower base payment
% of Kids 77.26 76.88 83.48 74.68 22.74 23.12 16.52 25.32
Fam. Earnings* 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.15 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.37
*Earnings data are based on Table 1. The numbers are normalized to 
total family earnings of married couples
TABLE 8b: Welfare Experiments (with benchmark mariage decisions)
Model US Model US Model US Model US
Benchmark Economy
% of Kids 82.90 76.88 84.77 74.68 17.10 23.12 15.23 25.32
Fam. Earnings* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.15 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.37
Expt. 1: restriction to single mothers 
% of Kids 83.32 76.88 85.42 74.68 16.68 23.12 14.58 25.32
Fam. Earnings* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.15 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.37
Expt. 2: Expt. 1 + fertility bonus
% of Kids 73.31 76.88 77.66 74.68 26.69 30.97 22.34 23.35
Fam. Earnings* 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.15 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.37
Expt. 3: Expt. 2 + lower base payment
% of Kids 78.99 76.88 80.02 74.68 21.01 23.12 19.98 25.32
Fam. Earnings* 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.15 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.37
*Earnings data are based on Table 1. The numbers are normalized to 
total family earnings of married couples
Married Parents Single Parents
Period 0 Period 1 Period 0 Period 1
Married Parents Single Parents
Period 0 Period 1 Period 0 Period 1
TABLE 9: Human Capital Investment in Children
mean 1st 2nd 3d 4th 5th
Benchmark 100.00 100 100 100 100 100
Expt. 1: restriction to single mothers 100.84 101.94 100.09 100.23 100.59 100.52
Expt. 2: Expt. 1 + fertility bonus 94.15 75.80 87.95 94.67 95.09 95.15
Expt. 3: Expt. 2 + lower base payment 98.12 92.02 98.47 99.24 99.00 98.62
TABLE 10: Income Inequality
Benchmark 3.873
Expt. 1: restriction to single mothers 3.798
Expt. 2: Expt. 1 + fertility bonus 5.312
Expt. 3: Expt. 2 + lower base payment 4.194
TABLE 11a: Utility Distribution --- Females
Economy 1st 2nd 3d 4th 5th
Benchmark 100 100 100 100 100
Expt. 1: restriction to single mothers 99.959 100.099 100.108 100.114 100.082
Expt. 2: Expt. 1 + fertility bonus 99.068 99.053 98.825 98.871 98.993
Expt. 3: Expt. 2 + lower base payment 99.074 99.313 99.398 99.501 99.644
TABLE 11b: Utility Distribution --- Males
Economy 1st 2nd 3d 4th 5th
Benchmark 100 100 100 100 100
Expt. 1: restriction to single mothers 99.975 100.232 100.193 100.210 100.173
Expt. 2: Expt. 1 + fertility bonus 94.553 97.012 97.979 98.216 98.235
Expt. 3: Expt. 2 + lower base payment 98.437 99.619 99.660 99.570 99.571
Household Income Quantile
5th quantile/1st quantile
3.787
Household Income Quantile
Household Income Quantile
3.755
4.088
3.763
Married/Single
Figure 1: Income and Fertility
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